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Question: Do you agree with T.E. Lawrence's assertion that: Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents.Discuss. Answer: Introduction T.E. Lawrence or Lawrence of Arabia is considered one of the few leaders in military history that has been successful as a campaign planner and a military theorist. This paper entails about the war theory developed by Lawrence and his contemplation about his theatre of operations. The paper further discusses about the manner in which his war theory has been applied to assist him in planning for the Arab campaign during the World War I. The manner in which the war theory developed by Lawrence has been used to address Arabs means (use of the available resources) and ends (desired end state for the war) and the ways that have been used to implement the means to achieve such ends shall also be discussed in this paper. The effective military campaign developed by Lawrence exemplifies asymmetric warfare one of which is irregular warfare or guerilla warfare. The warfare campaign developed by Lawrence signified potential effectiveness of irregular forces as opposed to the conventional troops and demonstrated the intricacies that are faced by the conventional troops while combating the irregular forces. Background During 1914 and 1918, the Arab revolt in Palestine is perceived as a valuable addition to the British eastern campaign. Thomas Edward Lawrence was the man who developed and encouraged the Arabs campaign after which he became renowned as the Lawrence of Arabia. Lawrence was known as a practitioner of guerrilla warfare and his leadership skills in the Arab revolt is a glaring example of a classic guerilla action[1]. However, he did not lead the Arab revolt as the Arab had their command structure that they had built on their own. Lawrence gained his achievement through his contribution in the revolt as an adviser who led the Arabs struggle for independence as a fundamental and significant part of the joined campaign to triumph over Turkey. Since Lawrence possessed knowledge about military history he contemplated that the warfare strategy of the Arabs during 1916 was not in accordance with the traditional military theory. The distinctiveness in the Arabs warfare strategy led him to devel op his own warfare theory, a theory that emerged as a unique operational doctrine, concept and a campaign design. The Theory Lawrence was highly educated and while assisting the Arabs in their revolt against Turkey, he realized that the traditional notions of conventional battles were inadequate[2]. During the war, he developed his own philosophy with respect to the irregular form of warfare. Lawrence considered strategy and tactics to be mere perspectives from which the elements of war are contemplated. His perceived strategy as a warfare element that is eternal and remains the same while tactics as a warfare element that are subjected to constant change. Lawrence used these two different perspectives to assess the warfare strategies and proposed that irregular warfare comprises three essential elements namely, biological, algebraical and psychological. The algebraic element deals with known invariables and was perceived as an essential element of warfare that was mainly mathematical and technical in nature. It included factors like time and space, weapons, lines of communication, terrain, fortresses, etc. Lawrence applied the algebraic element during the Arab revolt by calculating that Turks would require six times more army to prevent the Arab troops[3]. The immense space factor was used to assess the space covered by the desert for manipulating the main targets over a long period. The time factor was utilized as a weapon against the enemy to demoralize them and undermine their strength[4]. Given the huge area that was covered by the Arabs, Lawrence assumed that it would have been impossible for the Turks troop to exercise control o ver such massive area. The biological element was applied to the human factor during the warfare, which dealt with uncertainty. He analyzed that anything that the uncertainty in the algebraic elements attributed to the actions of the individuals, thus, forming the biological element. Lawrence believed that since majority of the tactics are taught, the biological element tested the instinct of the Generals to use the most appropriate tactics against the best part of the attack. The biological element tests the relative strength of the troops[5]. Lawrence assumed that though the Turks can afford to lose the troops but cannot afford to lose their equipment along the long supply-lines. On the other hand, the Arabs could have afforded to lose few men. This incident led Lawrence to believe that unplanned hit-and-run strikes against the communication lines and supplies were more essential than opting for against the superior troops directly. This is because accurate intelligence to avoid engaging into battles wit h superior troops was a crucial strategy of this type of warfare. Lastly, the third essential element of irregular type of warfare deals with the psychological factor, which not only involves the will and mind of the two opponent forces, but also the people of the two countries involved in such warfare[6]. Lawrence considered that information operations, propaganda are crucial to the irregular warfare strategy. The printing press was analyzed to be essential for warfare as it forms as means to elevate friendly morale and at the same time, demoralize the opponent force. According to Lawrences strategy, it was important for the Arab troops to understand the fact that they are striving to cast out a foreign power for the purpose of achieving an independent homeland. However, it was not a common objective or joint motive of the European allies during such war. This strategy and belief fortified the ability of the Arab troops to endure the privations and losses of the war, thus, leading to an advantage over the Turks. On the other hand, this strategy wo rked equally well against the Turks who felt demoralized and isolated which was vital to succeed in the irregular campaign. Lawrences concept of Irregular Warfare In his thesis on Irregular warfare, he discussed six essential principles with respect to irregular warfare. Firstly, it is important for irregular forces to maintain unassailable base that is secure and which is used to operate their warfare strategies. For instance, the Arab troops operated from oasis and desert camps that acted as a secure unassailable base which was completely secure as the Turk troops could neither attack or locate such bases[7]. Secondly, the irregular force must be involved with a conventional military force or technologically sophisticated enemy. During the Arab revolt, the Arabs faced a conventional European force that was entirely dependent on modern communications, weapons and was conventionally trained. Thirdly, in order to dominate the battle area from widespread fortifications, it is important that the enemy force does not have sufficient number of men in its troops. This was evident from the lack of sufficient number of men in Turkish troops, which permitted to guard selected railway areas and important outposts only[8]. The lack of sufficient number of men in the Turkish troop led to their failure in exercising control over majority of the Arabian land sea. Fourthly, it is prerequisite that the local population supports the irregular force by providing them with relevant information about the enemy and remains loyal to such irregular forces. This is again evident from the fact that the Middle East was supportive of the Arab irregulars for they knew that they were striving to liberate themselves from the invasion of the foreign invaders, which would lead to the establishment of the Arab state. Lastly, the fifth principle states that it is important for the irregular force to have speed, presence, endurance and independent lines of supply. The reliance of the irregular forces on camels signified the presence of these features, which enabled the Arab troop to achieve initiative and maintain the same during the war[9]. The Arab forces were able to come and go anywhere they pleased without facing any impediments with respect to their roads, railways or supply lines. The significance of these principles is that the irregular force must have technical competency to combat the communication and logistics vulnerabilities of the opponent force. Analysis of the warfare means developed by Lawrence Lawrence proposed the following thesis that quite summarized its operational concept during warfare: Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit quite in vain. Lawrence designed a campaign for the Arabs that excluded the Turkey forces from the Arab lands applying the algebraic element[10]. The campaign designed included the biological element as well that is evident from the fewer loss of life from the Arab troop and with the freedom of the population; he finally applied the psychological element in the campaign design. After defining the end state for his warfare campaign, Lawrence attempted to analyze the remains that were available to accomplish the designed outcome. There were two essential parts to his analysis of the means, firstly, the recognition of the available resources and its features; secondly, he aimed at designing an operational concept and a doctrine that aimed at optimizing the capabilities of the resource in order to develop effective means. Lawrence used the three essential elements (algebraical, biological and psychological) as the framework for his analysis[11]. He believed that the available resources like men, tribesmen who were though not well versed with the skilled warfare, but their endurance, knowledge about the country and individual intelligence formed algebraically, a significant part of the Arab troop. Following the recognition of the available resources, Lawrence determined the individual characteristics of the men in the in the Arab troop. He perceived them as humanity in battle, which depicted the biological element of warfare. Lawrence developed an operational concept and a fighting doctrine that are closely related to the warfare theory subsequent to the identification of the available resources and its attributes[12]. While a warfare theory aims at explaining a process, an operational concept usually refer to the broad concept that defines the operations that the Army troops are about to implement in their future battlefields. It not only serves as a part of the doctrine but is also considered as an intermediate product. The need for an operational concept was important to utilize the resources as a means. However, Lawrence laid emphasis on his three essential war elements while developing the operational concept or doctrine. Lawrence considered mobility as an advantage to reduce the effect of the numerical superiority of the Turk army and this mobility enabled the Arabs to conquer the desert, thus, giving them the depth[13]. Since the Turk army lacked mobility, they had to exercise control over fixed posts whereas the Arab troops had the opportunity to avert any confrontation with the Turk army by covering them in the desert until they consider that a particular situation is suitable for them to attack the opponent force. The mobility factor of the Arabs provided them with the time factor that is essentially an algebraically element for the doctrine of mobility as was observed by Lawrence. His doctrine of mobility asserts that the time and speed are the significant warfare strategy of the Arabs that are more powerful than attacking the opponent forces[14]. This is because range or the space factor was more powerful and greater than the power of the opponent forces. Further, Lawrence considered that it should be the primary objective of the irregular force to ensure that the opponent force is exhausted and is not left with adequate strength to fight the battle. It is highly imperative to identify the weakness or the weakest point of the combatant forces and to wait for the time when the strength of the opponent forces wears down. In order to grind down the enemy troop, Lawrence emphasized on the biological element that is, the essential resources of the Turk army. In Turkey troops, there were insufficient number of men not as worthy as their equipment[15]. Therefore, Lawrence aimed at destroying the resources of the Turk troop instead of them as the destruction of a Turkish rail bridge or machine gun was more effective than the death of the Turk men. On the other hand, at the present day, the Arab army was cautious about men and in resources as well. Lawrence adopted a war of detachment where the operational concept along with his doctrine signified a clever transformation of weakness into strength. Lawrence designed the war campaign for the Arabs in the manner that they remain a silent threat of a huge unknown desert, thus, not revealing until the opponent force is attacked[16]. Moreover, he always emphasized upon attacking the resources and not the men. The ideal strategy designed for the war was to use the smallest force within the shortest possible time at the farthest place. Lawrence aimed at relying upon intelligence in order to ensure security for his war operations. He believed that in order to achieve security from detection of the opponent force, it is important to have adequate knowledge about the opponent force. He believed that mobility along with security were necessary to refuse targets to the enemy. According to Lawrence, the concept of security includes three essential elements. The first element is intelligence, which aims at eradicating uncertainty. However, later when Lawrence realized that this was not possible, he relied on the second element that is, reserve force[17]. The second element refers to the reserves that are maintained to amend any accidental flaws with respect to the materials used during the war. The third element refers to the secure base, which is also identified as the psychological element of the war. This element was an outcome of the fact that it is not possible for the combatant forces to fight all the time, therefor e, it is essential to use a secure base area as sanctuaries[18]. According to the theory developed by Lawrence, it is important that the force must have an unassailable base, something that safeguards the force from being subject to attack or from the fear of being attacked. Secure bases in the interior of the country were essential for the long ranging raiding forces. In order to secure such areas, Lawrence relied upon the concept of arranging the minds of the people through propaganda. He used propaganda to seek support from the local population in the battle against the Turk troops[19]. According to the warfare theory, Lawrence believed that in order to secure a base area, it is important to have a friendly and supportive population. The population need not be actively friendly but must be sympathetic enough not to betray against the enemy force. This was evident from the warfare strategy adopted by the Arabs according to which, when the civilians learn to sacrifice their lives for the idea of freedom, it can be said that a province is conquered. In regards to the means available to Lawrence for influencing men to support them in their struggle for freedom against the Turk army, each of the means applied were extraordinary. According to Lawrence, the printing press was the most significant and effective weapon that could be utilized by the modern commander. He believed that the ability to use the new communication methods is always more favorable for the intellectual compared to the application of the physical methods[20]. This strategy has been demonstrated in the Arab revolt where the ability of the Arabs to influence the local populace to support them in their freedom struggle against the Turk troops through printing press and distribution of propaganda has worked in their favor, in particular, when they lacked algebraic factors. The guerilla leaders in the history have given utmost importance to the summarized thesis developed by Lawrence in fifty words as a basic warfare formula. The leaders have contemplated the significance associated with the principle rebellions have an unassailable base which ensures safety of the troops from sudden attack from opponent forces as well as safeguards them from the fear of being subjected to any such attack[21]. A secured unassailable base is a necessity during wars as it enables to remain concealed from the opponent force until the time when the troop hiding finds an appropriate time to attack against the opponent force. Such a secure base not only implies a territorial secured base but it can also be found in the support of the men when they readily sacrifice their lives for the cause of the army troops that struggles for liberation against the enemy army force[22]. The other significant part of the thesis is the doctrine to convert every subject to friendliness that is the rebellions should receive support from the local populace which may not be actively friendly but are sympathetic to the extent of not betraying to such rebel movements for the enemy army troop. He considered mobility along with security to be significant factors in warfare as it gives the army forces adequate time and opportunity to attack the enemy force and safeguard its troops for counterattacks, at the same time. The mobility and adequate security would deny the targets to the enemy, resulting in fewer losses of lives of the army force and providing them with opportunities to attack at the appropriate time. The warfare theory developed by Lawrence emphasizes on the fact that unlike other warfare strategies that aims at attacking the men in the troops, the resources of any enemy troop should be targeted to destroy every means that are available to the enemy force. This would not only demoralize the enemy force but also grind down their means of resources to plan any counterattacks, creating a situation favorable for the army force. In the Arab revolt, range proved to be better and more powerful than force as the Arabs did not have anything substantial to lose therefore they had nothing to defend. Time and speed were their trump cards instead of hitting as these factors endowed them with strategical strength instead of tactical strength[23]. Implications and Conclusion The accomplishment of Lawrence during the World War I can be examined in two areas. Firstly, Lawrences education and knowledge about military theory ensures that it is important for the military leaders to study and understand their profession[24]. It was only for his education that Lawrence could recognize that traditional war theories were not suitable in the Arab war. Secondly, it is the theory of irregular warfare that Lawrence developed himself as the theory endows with a unique idea of future war. The principles of irregular warfare developed by Lawrence are applied in the counterinsurgency (COIN) operations that are going on between the terrorists and insurgents in both Afghanistan and Iraq[25]. The principles developed and the experiences faced by Lawrence during the Arab revolt have unfolded several features of irregular warfare that are applicable in the present asymmetric conflicts. The first of such principles is time that is used as a weapon to the insurgent. The insurgents are not usually inclined to defend or seek for territories or quick victories. The insurgent aims at having lengthy campaign that usually wears down the will or moral of the stronger troop. This principle has been applied in the Vietnam War leading to their victory over the United States and France and this strategy is being applied in the present struggles between Iraq and Afghanistan. The Vietnam War demonstrates ignorance and lack of critical though of the United States towards the Communist Vietn amese. The US army neither attempted to analyze the strategic thinking of the Vietnam army leader nor attempted to conduct any biographical studies regarding the enemy leaders. The US was very ignorant about the strategy and character of the Vietnam military leader. Secondly, the international use of media is a potential weapon that can be used by irregular forces to support their struggle and shape up their opinion both at home and foreign, serve as means to recruit, obtain financial support and wear down he will of the enemy military leader[26]. Thirdly, the operation of the irregular forces in small groups instead of large formations will make it difficult for the enemy group to locate the small groups, thus, the irregular forces in small units acts as an advantage for the weaker forces. These two principles were demonstrated in the Malayan Emergency. In 1948, the Malayan Communist Party initiated an insurgency against the Malaya and British government to bring about the communist run state. Templar, the military leader emphasized on social changes, economic stability, civil relief and small unit operations. He also focused on securing the police posts all over the country and laid emphasis on capturing or turning insurgents instead of killing them, as he believed that the surrendered insurgents work with him to weaken the former comrades. Templar believed that a surrender policy through media and propaganda shall be best possible intelligence to weaken the opponent forces. Therefore, it can be stated that being a practitioner and theorist of the art of war, Lawrence signified the power of military theory that merged to develop appropriate strategy and tactics in war. He developed a guerilla warfare theory that persists to hold relevance even in the contemporary era. Thus, given the number of achievements, Lawrence stands as an ideal model for the military officers preparing them to face the challenges in the modern era, both emotionally and intellectually. Bibliography Balcells, Laia, and Stathis N. Kalyvas. "Does warfare matter? Severity, duration, and outcomes of civil wars."Journal of Conflict Resolution58.8 (2014): 1390-1418. Becker, Major Patrick J.Cavalry Operations In Support Of Low Intensity Conflict. Pickle Partners Publishing, 2015. Betts, Richard K., ed.Conflict after the Cold War: arguments on causes of war and peace. Taylor Francis, 2017. Dempsey, Major Thomas A.DESERT GUERRILLAS:: Psychological Social And Economic Characteristics Of The Bedouin Which Lend Themselves To Irregular Warfare. Pickle Partners Publishing, 2015. Farquhar, John T. "Airpower and irregular war: a battle of ideas."Air Space Power Journal31.1 (2017): 51. Gibson, Matthew. "Seven Pillars of Destruction: TE Lawrences Contribution to Counterinsurgency." (2016). Gilady, Lilach, and Sidney Smith Hall. "The Changing Face of War." (2015). Herath, Oshadhi. "Guerilla Movement as a Well Planned organization." (2015). Hoffman, Major Patricia D.Seeking shadows in the sky: the strategy of air guerrilla warfare. Pickle Partners Publishing, 2015. Jackson, Colin F. "Information Is Not a Weapons System."Journal of Strategic Studies39.5-6 (2016): 820-846. Johnson, Rob. "The First World War and the Middle East: a literature review of recent scholarship."Middle Eastern Studies54.1 (2018): 142-151. Khdour, Naser, Martin Harris, and David Weir. "The imperial legacies of TE Lawrence: A study in political and organizational hybridity."International Business Research7.8 (2014): 123. Labarre, Frdric, and Pierre Jolicoeur. "Shaping and measuring military culture development: a case study of the defence education enhancement program."Canadian Foreign Policy Journal22.2 (2016): 135-146. Lawrence, Daniel S., Thomas E. Christoff, and Justin H. Escamilla. "Predicting procedural justice behavior: examining communication and personality."Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies Management40.1 (2017): 141-154. Lawrence, Thomas Edward.27 Articles. Simon and Schuster, 2017. MORAVEC, Lud?k. "Defence Strategy."Europe(2015). MORAVEC, Lud?k. "The Afghan Mission: The Other Side of the COIN."Crisis(2015). Pye, Lucian W.Guerilla Communism in Malaya. Princeton University Press, 2015. Scheipers, Sibylle. "Counterinsurgency or irregular warfare? Historiography and the study of small wars."Small Wars Insurgencies25.5-6 (2014): 879-899. Scheipers, Sibylle. "Counterinsurgency or irregular warfare? Historiography and the study of small wars."Small Wars Insurgencies25.5-6 (2014): 879-899. Schutte, Sebastian. "Geography, outcome, and casualties: A unified model of insurgency."Journal of Conflict Resolution59.6 (2015): 1101-1128. Tabachnick, Stephen E. "TE Lawrence Correspondence."English Literature in Transition, 1880-192060.3 (2017): 380-383. van den Berg, B. C. M.American Propaganda Against the Enemy: Korea and Vietnam. BS thesis. 2017. Ward Gventer, Celeste. "Counterinsurgency and its Critics."Journal of Strategic Studies37.4 (2014): 637-663. Watts, Stephen, J. Michael Polich, and Derek Eaton. "Rapid Regeneration of Irregular Warfare Capacity." (2015). Gibson, Matthew. "Seven Pillars of Destruction: TE Lawrences Contribution to Counterinsurgency." (2016). Lawrence, Thomas Edward. 27 Articles. Simon and Schuster, 2017. Farquhar, John T. "Airpower and irregular war: a battle of ideas." Air Space Power Journal 31.1 (2017): 51. Gibson, Matthew. "Seven Pillars of Destruction: TE Lawrences Contribution to Counterinsurgency." (2016). Scheipers, Sibylle. "Counterinsurgency or irregular warfare? Historiography and the study of small wars." Small Wars Insurgencies 25.5-6 (2014): 879-899. Farquhar, John T. "Airpower and irregular war: a battle of ideas." Air Space Power Journal 31.1 (2017): 51. Khdour, Naser, Martin Harris, and David Weir. "The imperial legacies of TE Lawrence: A study in political and organizational hybridity." International Business Research 7.8 (2014): 123. Johnson, Rob. "The First World War and the Middle East: a literature review of recent scholarship." Middle Eastern Studies 54.1 (2018): 142-151. Lawrence, Daniel S., Thomas E. Christoff, and Justin H. Escamilla. "Predicting procedural justice behavior: examining communication and personality." Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies Management 40.1 (2017): 141-154. Labarre, Frdric, and Pierre Jolicoeur. "Shaping and measuring military culture development: a case study of the defence education enhancement program." Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 22.2 (2016): 135-146. Schutte, Sebastian. "Geography, outcome, and casualties: A unified model of insurgency." Journal of Conflict Resolution59.6 (2015): 1101-1128. Hoffman, Major Patricia D. Seeking shadows in the sky: the strategy of air guerrilla warfare. Pickle Partners Publishing, 2015. Tabachnick, Stephen E. "TE Lawrence Correspondence." English Literature in Transition, 1880-1920 60.3 (2017): 380-383. an den Berg, B. C. M. American Propaganda Against the Enemy: Korea and Vietnam. BS thesis. 2017. Balcells, Laia, and Stathis N. Kalyvas. "Does warfare matter? Severity, duration, and outcomes of civil wars." Journal of Conflict Resolution 58.8 (2014): 1390-1418. Betts, Richard K., ed. Conflict after the Cold War: arguments on causes of war and peace. Taylor Francis, 2017. Becker, Major Patrick J. Cavalry Operations In Support Of Low Intensity Conflict. Pickle Partners Publishing, 2015. Gilady, Lilach, and Sidney Smith Hall. "The Changing Face of War." (2015). Jackson, Colin F. "Information Is Not a Weapons System." Journal of Strategic Studies 39.5-6 (2016): 820-846. MORAVEC, Lud?k. "The Afghan Mission: The Other Side of the COIN." Crisis (2015). Ward Gventer, Celeste. "Counterinsurgency and its Critics." Journal of Strategic Studies 37.4 (2014): 637-663. Pye, Lucian W. Guerilla Communism in Malaya. Princeton University Press, 2015. MORAVEC, Lud?k. "Defence Strategy." Europe (2015). Herath, Oshadhi. "Guerilla Movement as a Well Planned organization." (2015). Scheipers, Sibylle. "Counterinsurgency or irregular warfare? Historiography and the study of small wars." Small Wars Insurgencies 25.5-6 (2014): 879-899. Watts, Stephen, J. Michael Polich, and Derek Eaton. "Rapid Regeneration of Irregular Warfare Capacity." (2015).